


DIVISIONS WITHIN THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP:  
A SIMULATED POLL \*

by



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Paper Presented to the 20th Annual Convention of the  
International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada  
March 21-24, 1979

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Introduction

Cuba's role as an international actor is unique in the Third World in the broadness of its scope, its heavy involvement in non-regional issues, and the utilization of military force in conflicts that have no bearing on its own security. While Cuba's size is small, its impact in international affairs has been large. For example, the number of Cuban combat troops stationed in Africa is comparable--relative to its population--to US involvement in Vietnam at the height of that war.<sup>1</sup> Although Cuba's willingness to commit large combat forces in a distant conflict is a relatively recent development, the Castro regime has been a major preoccupation of US policymakers for twenty years.<sup>2</sup>

Because of this preoccupation, US policymakers need a clear understanding of the lines of cleavage within the Cuban leadership. Intelligence analysts, therefore, must do more than merely identify the members of the Cuban power elite and classify them according to a variety of biographic attributes. It is also necessary to determine whether political factions exist within the elite, and to identify the policy views of those groups.

In accomplishing these tasks, intelligence analysts following Cuba are confronted by two major obstacles. The first obstacle is faced by all observers of closed political systems: the absence of sufficient and reliable data. Information on the political opinions of Cuban decision-makers obviously is highly difficult to obtain. Second, the analyst must communicate his or her findings to a busy policymaker who has little patience for lengthy or complex studies. Intelligence analyses must be concise and understandable if they are to be read by persons in authority. Good analysis is not enough; an efficient presentation is also essential.<sup>3</sup>

This paper describes an experimental approach--that is currently being tested--to the analysis of political divisions within the Cuban hierarchy and to the resolution of the problems of data scarcity and presentational technique. We call the approach simulated polling.<sup>4</sup> (The methodology is described in greater detail in Appendix A.)

As a first step, we identified seven key individuals and groups that make up the Cuban decision-making elite. The identity and composition of these groups is discussed below. The next step involved the selection of 24 policy issues that confronted the Cuban leadership during 1978.

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(The 24 issues are listed in Appendix B.) Since it was not possible to poll the Cuban leaders directly, we relied upon expert-generated data. A panel of six analysts who have had considerable experience on Cuba participated in the study.<sup>5</sup> Each member of the panel assessed the attitude of each of the seven individuals or groups in the decision-making elite on the set of 24 issues. In essence, the panel members responded to an opinion poll as surrogates for Fidel Castro and his associates. Taken as a whole, the responses represent a complex set of attitudes held--according to the panel--by the Cuban hierarchy. The final step involved the use of multidimensional scaling to organize the data generated by the panel and to construct a visual model of the policy divisions within the Cuban leadership.<sup>6</sup>

#### The Cuban Leadership and Decisionmaking

Cuban scholars both in and out of government agree that the Cuban regime cannot be viewed as a monolithic structure. It is held that the hierarchy consists of various groupings, factions, or coalitions with differing viewpoints and interests over which Fidel Castro has exercised unifying authority.<sup>7</sup> The existence of these groups, however, has been overshadowed by Fidel's dominant role since 1959.

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Following the collapse of the guerrilla struggle in the late 1960s and the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest, Fidel had little choice but to permit a governmental reorganization that would place some restraints on his improvisational leadership style. The reorganization of Cuban institutions that began in 1970 and is now virtually completed has brought about some decentralization in decisionmaking, has vitalized the party and government and has been accompanied by more rational economic policies. Nevertheless, the Cuban political system is still dominated by Fidel Castro.

His power and that of his brother, Raul, is clearly reflected in their presence at the head of the five major policymaking bodies in the Cuban government: the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) Political Bureau, the PCC Secretariat, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly. In theory, the National Assembly constitutes the highest organ of the Cuban government. When it is not in session (it only meets twice annually), the authority to approve laws is vested in the Council of State. The Council of Ministers, under the guidance of the Council of State, handles the largest volume of, and the most important, legislation. In actual fact, however, all major decisions emanate from the Castro brothers and the Political Bureau, the heart of the party and regime leadership. The party Secretariat relays Political Bureau decisions to the administrative apparatus.

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The key members of the current Cuban leadership have their origins in the 1956-58 guerrilla struggle against President Batista, but post-1970 developments have broadened that base.<sup>8</sup> The restructuring of the Cuban economy following the disastrous 1970 sugar harvest and Cuban military involvement in Africa, particularly Angola and Ethiopia, have spawned new actors in Cuba's ruling coalition. Former leaders of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the pre-Castro Communist Party, new technocratic-administrative civilians and military officers in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the armed forces itself have become important elements in Cuban decisionmaking. The influence of the technocrats and younger military officers is likely to rise as Castro becomes more willing to listen to expert advice and less prone to rely solely on his personal instincts to make spontaneous political, economic, and social decisions. Nonetheless, the dominant forces in the Cuban leadership still consist of the ex-guerrilla elite led by Fidel and Raul Castro.

The seven actors listed below constitute the significant elements of the Cuban leadership today. Three of these actors are individuals (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez); the remaining four represent major political groupings whose similar origins or institutional affiliations are presumed to have produced similar policy views.

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Fidel Castro

Regardless of what official title Fidel Castro has held during his 20-year reign in Cuba, his charismatic hold on the Cuban populace has made him the linchpin of the revolutionary process he has dominated from the outset. He is likely to remain the center of power in Cuba as long as he is in good health. His leadership is unchallenged and his authority is supreme despite the extensive institutional changes Cuba has undergone. Opposition to Castro, particularly in the early days of the regime, has been diluted or eliminated. Today, Fidel owes his strong position to the loyalty of ex-guerrilla combatants (the "fidelistas" who are described below) who control the Cuban security forces and hold key positions in the government and party and his immense popularity with the Cuban people.

Raul Castro

Raul is the undisputed number-two man in Cuba. He is the one adviser Fidel trusts more than any other and is steadily expanding his influence in decisionmaking. He ranks second to his older brother by virtue of familial and revolutionary ties and also his institutional positions; he is first vice president of the Councils of Ministers and

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State, second secretary of the PCC Political Bureau and Secretariat. He enjoys relatively free rein in fashioning the military establishment. Many of the guerrillas who fought under his command in the Sierra Cristal now hold important positions in the military and government. This, along with his ties to Moscow, upon whom the Cuban military establishment is dependent for virtually all of its military equipment, have provided him with his own power base. This solid base of support would be his foundation should he ever have to take over the Cuban leadership. Although he had devoted himself almost exclusively to the armed forces in the past, Raul has become increasingly involved in domestic and foreign policy issues that technically fall outside his purview as head of the military establishment.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez

Third in influence in the Cuban leadership, Rodriguez provides a bridge between the "old communists" and the "technocrats" and, through them, to Castro. He is in charge of much of Cuba's foreign policy apparatus and is a major government spokesman at international gatherings. He is the only economist among the top leaders and as such, is a key figure in the formulation of economic policy in both the

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foreign and domestic realms. Rodriguez is one of the few members of the PSP (the "old communists," who are described below) to emerge unscathed from the purges directed against the party and he is the only former PSP leader to have strengthened his position within the regime. He publicly expressed his differences with the late Che Guevara's emphasis on moral incentives, centralization of administration, and the elimination of money during the economic debates of the mid-1960s and argued for orthodox economic planning techniques.<sup>9</sup> The failure of the Guevarist model and the subsequent setbacks caused by the 1970 sugar harvest led to his strengthened position within the leadership. While he is not a member of Fidel's inner circle, his professional expertise and his close links with many of the technocrats along with his connections to Moscow have enabled him to steadily expand his influence.

#### The Fidelistas

This group constitutes the stable inner core around Fidel and is comprised of a major part of the PCC Central Committee. Their loyalty to Fidel is derived from a variety of reasons:

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some have been associated with Fidel since the days of the Moncada attack and the guerrilla struggle; others were members of the Student Revolutionary Directorate during the anti-Batista struggle; still others were involved in the urban underground of the 26th of July Movement during the years of the insurrection. Political Bureau members generally presumed to fall in this category include Juan Almeida, Ramiro Valdes, Armando Hart, Sergio del Valle, Guillermo Garcia and Pedro Miret.<sup>10</sup> They have a strong interest in preserving Castro's commanding role in the regime and maintaining the present distribution of power against encroachment from newcomers. They are very nationalistic; their entire adult lives have been spent in the shadow of what they see as aggressive US actions.

#### The Technocrats

This group consists primarily of younger individuals distinguished by their technical-administrative competence rather than their revolutionary or ideological ties. Many of the younger technocrats have little or no personal recollection of the Batista era. Their first concern is the maximization and rationalization of production and distribution through administrative reform. Their influence has been rising since the late 1960s when the deteriorating economic-political

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situation in Cuba brought about a reorganization in the Cuban government and a reorientation in its economic policies. The ability of this group to have an impact on policymaking is likely to increase as the Cuban Revolution becomes more institutionalized and the economy more complex. The primary representative of this group in the Political Bureau is Arnaldo Milian who is also a former member of the PSP.

#### The New Military

Cuba's military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia has created a second generation of combat-tested veterans that are beginning to assume increasingly important positions in the military establishment behind the first line of "fidelista" commanders. Trained and equipped by the Soviets, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) possess a disciplined coercive capacity unmatched by other organizations. There is a growing number of junior officers who were born in the 1940s and whose formative political experiences are different than those of the "fidelistas." They have gone through military academies, received technical educations in the management of sophisticated weaponry, logistics, engineering, and military organization and consequently their military skills are far more advanced than many of the ex-guerrillas. In addition to their role in the military establishment,

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these younger officers began to play an increasingly important role in the economy beginning in 1968. This is reflected in the rising influence of former military officers in technical and economic planning positions.

Military pre-eminence in the Castro regime is likely to remain as the more pragmatic elements of the leadership--particularly the aged hierarchy of the pre-Castro communist party--die out. The Cuban combat role in Angola and Ethiopia provides continued justification for military priorities, and the return of war veterans from Africa introduces new blood into the upper echelons of the military establishment.

#### The Old Communists

These veterans of the pre-Castro communist party lend the Cuban leadership a certain element of seasoning and experience and are more likely to seek compromise than confrontation in settling policy disputes. They are prone to represent Soviet interests in the formulation of Cuban domestic and foreign policy. A generation older than the guerrilla elite, they have a more solid background in politics and administration and have helped the country stave off economic collapse. They are at a high point of their influence today, but this influence is likely to wane over the next few years because of their advanced age. Since they

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have no power base of their own, they have had to rely heavily on Soviet backing and Fidel's sufferance; they are, however, Castro's main link to Moscow. Inclined toward cooperation and avoidance of internal strife, they experienced a resurgence of importance in the late 1960s when Fidel realized that he would have to move Cuba closer to Moscow. The primary representative of this group in the Political Bureau is Blas Roca. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez who is described above and Arnaldo Milian also are former members of the PSP but both have strong links to the "technocrats" as well.

#### The Issues

In order to analyze attitudinal differences within the Cuban leadership, 24 major policy questions were selected. These issues are not intended to be a comprehensive catalog of every topic discussed by the Cuban hierarchy; rather they are representative of the five basic themes confronting Cuba's top decision-makers:

--Expansion or reduction of Cuba's military role in Africa.

--Level of support for Latin American revolutionary movements.

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--Relations with the USSR.

--Relations with the US.

--Domestic economic priorities.

The questions were designed to highlight different opinions within the leadership. Each was phrased in terms of a possible policy option to be undertaken by the Cuban government. In a number of cases, several policy options were presented in a series of 3 - 4 questions. This permitted the panel members to specify with greater precision the policy preferences of the seven leadership groups or individuals. Moreover, an effort was made to select controversial issues. Those questions on which there is near complete agreement would tell us little about cleavages within the elite. Therefore, the results of this analysis tend to emphasize differences within the elite. (A complete list of the questions is provided in Appendix B.)

Figure 1 provides a representation of the attitudes ascribed to each of the seven actors by the panel on the questions relating to Africa (Questions 1 - 7). Each of these questions revolved about the larger issue of whether Cuba should pursue an even more aggressive policy in Africa than is now the case. It was expected that the content of these questions would produce a relatively straightforward


dimensional scaling technique confirmed this expectation.<sup>11</sup> Raul Castro and the new military whose prestige and influence have been considerably enhanced by the performance of the Cuban armed forces in Africa were seen as holding the most aggressive tendencies on these questions. The "technocrats," apparently concerned about the economic disruptions that could result from further African adventures, were judged as less favorable toward a significant expansion of Cuba's military activities.

The most interesting aspect of the continuum, however, was the existence of only one clearly separate and cohesive opinion group, Raul Castro and the "new military." None of the other actors, however, show a close affinity for any other. The existence of a broad range of opinion rather than a sharp dichotomy suggests that a highly divisive debate over the policy of military intervention in Africa is unlikely to develop within the Cuban leadership.

The questions relating to the support of Latin American revolutionaries (Questions 8 - 11) were expected to produce another "hawk-dove" dimension similar to that shown in Figure 1. An inspection of Figure 2 demonstrates that such a unidimensional configuration resulted, but it showed several significant differences to the African dimension.<sup>12</sup>

Expansion or Reduction of Cuban Military Role in Africa


Figure 1





Support for Latin American Revolutionary Movements

Figure 2



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The key difference is the apparent existence of an incipient dichotomy within the leadership on this issue. There is a fairly broad gap between the more cautious group (the "technocrats," Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and the "old communists") and the rest of the leadership. Nevertheless, the lack of cohesion on the two sides shows that a true dichotomy has not yet formed. It is possible, however, that given the right circumstances in Nicaragua or some other nation, a strong dichotomy could develop within the Cuban government.

The differences between Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the seven key actors react in different ways to the two issue areas. Thus an attempt to combine the results into a single "hawk-dove" continuum would distort some of the relationships between the actors. For example, Fidel Castro and the "fidelistas" are located closer to Raul Castro and the "new military" on the Latin America dimension. In addition, greater separation between Rodriguez and the "old communists" must be shown on the Africa dimension.

These requirements are met in the two dimensional solution shown in Figure 3.<sup>13</sup> The horizontal axis represents the Africa dimension and runs from the more cautious positions on the left to the more aggressive on the right. The order


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and relative distances shown in Figure 1 are retained along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the Latin America dimension and runs from the more cautious positions at the top to the more aggressive at the bottom. In this case the order shown in Figure 2 is duplicated, although some minor differences in the relative distances are apparent.

The two dimensional solution permits several conclusions about the policy positions of the Cuban leadership on these two issue sets. First, it can be seen that three general opinion groups exist within the elite. The most cohesive cluster consists of Raul Castro and the "new military" who are located in the quadrant occupied by those who tend to be aggressive on both African and Latin American issues. Their close proximity shows that they hold very similar views on both issue dimensions. In the opposite quadrant--occupied by actors who tend to be cautious on both the Africa and Latin America questions--a second cluster is apparent. This group (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the "technocrats," and the "old communists") is less cohesive than the Raul Castro-"new military" group. This results from their different outlooks on the two dimensions. Rodriguez and the "old communists" have nearly identical views regarding Latin America policy but have some differences on the Africa questions. Rodriguez,

Intervention in Africa and Latin America

Figure 3



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who has strong links to both the "old communists" and the "technocrats" is located between them on both dimensions.

The third opinion cluster consists of Fidel Castro and the "fidelistas." Although their positions are relatively close, they occupy different quadrants. The "fidelistas" are located just inside the quadrant occupied by those actors favoring the more aggressive policy options in both Africa and Latin America. Interestingly, Fidel Castro is the only actor occupying the lower left quadrant. Despite their positions in different quadrants, Fidel and the "fidelistas" show--as expected--fairly close agreement on both issue dimensions. The most important aspect of Fidel Castro's location, however, is its centrist location on both issue dimensions. Although his overpowering influence is sufficient by itself to dominate the decision-making process, his position relative to the actors undoubtedly facilitates the achievement of consensus. Without the powerful attraction of his charismatic leadership, there would be far less incentive for either of the other two clusters to abandon their position on a given issue in order to achieve a consensus within the leadership.

Figure 4 represents the policy positions of the seven actors on two new dimensions: relations with the USSR


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(Questions 12 - 15) and relations with the US (Questions 16 -19).<sup>14</sup> The horizontal axis represents the US dimension and runs from a "pro-normalization" position on the left to an "anti-normalization" position on the right. The ordering and the relative distances along this dimension are fairly similar to the alignments shown in Figures 1 and 2. The "technocrats," Rodriguez, and the "old communists" are again located on the opposite side of the continuum from Raul Castro and the "new military." Fidel Castro is again located in a centrist position. The "fidelistas," torn between their loyalty for their leader and an ingrained hostility toward the US are situated midway between Fidel and the extreme positions of Raul and the "new military."

The vertical axis represents the USSR dimension and runs from a "closer cooperation" position at the top to a "less dependence" position at the bottom. The alignment along this dimension shows a completely different orientation from Figures 1 and 2. On this issue dimension, the "old communists" and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez join forces with Raul Castro and the "new military." The "technocrats" depart from their usual extreme position and are located in a centrist position fairly close to Fidel. The "fidelistas" are essentially isolated on this issue, apparently as a result of their instinctive opposition to dependence on any

Relations with the US and USSR

Figure 4



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foreign power. This alignment suggests that Fidel Castro is seen as the only major actor favoring a modicum of independence from the USSR. Should he prematurely disappear from the political scene, Cuba might well lose all motivation to attain some semblance of independence from the USSR.

Figure 5 represents the policy positions of the seven actors on the single dimension of domestic economic priorities (Questions 20 - 24).<sup>15</sup> These questions were concerned with whether Cuba should continue its emphasis on economic development which would require continued consumer austerity. The results showed this issue area to be almost as divisive as the question of support for Latin American revolutionaries. This is not a surprising result; acrimonious debates over economic policy have been a regular feature of the Castro regime. The most notable example was the highly public debate during the mid-1960s in which Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and others opposed the unorthodox theories espoused by Che Guevara. The configuration shows that Raul Castro, the "new military," the "fidelistas," and to a lesser extent, Fidel Castro all favor continued consumer austerity in order to maximize investment in Cuba's overall development plan. The "technocrats," Rodriguez, and the "old communists" generally oppose this view, but there is a fairly substantial distance between the "technocrats" and the other two actors.

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


This issue is of considerable significance to the Cuban leadership. The low world price of sugar has severely hampered Cuba's ambitious economic development plans. Given its limited hard currency income and its heavy economic requirements, some sectors of the economy must be ignored and compromise solutions are difficult if not impossible to achieve. Consequently, each resource allocation decision has wide-ranging repercussions.

It is possible that a second dimension underlies some of the questions posed in this group, the ideological dimension that underpins Marxist economic theories. This possibility was explored in a two dimensional solution, but the results were inconclusive. It was concluded that the number and scope of the five questions on economic policy were insufficient to prove the existence of an ideological dimension. Additional research is therefore required on this issue category.

Domestic Economic Priorities

Figure 5



Summary

The analysis of the five issue categories resulted in five major findings concerning the judgments of the panel. First, three general opinion clusters exist within the Cuban elite: the first and most cohesive consisting of Raul Castro and the "new military," the second consisting of Fidel Castro and the "fidelistas," and the third made up of the "technocrats," Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and the "old communists." The Rodriguez-led group showed the least cohesion.

Second, the relative issue positions of these groups do not remain constant across all of the issue categories. Instead, the political relationships are highly complex. Figure 3 showed that there is a subtle but detectable difference between the alignment on the Latin America dimension and the alignment on the African issues. Figure 4 showed that the US dimension is similar to the African dimension, but is markedly different from the positions adopted on the USSR dimension. Figure 5 showed an orientation similar to the Latin American dimension, but there were suggestions that an ideological dimension may also exist. Thus, the Cuban political environment apparently has at least three separate policy alignments:

- 1) Africa - US
- 2) Latin America - Economic Policy
- 3) USSR

Third, the "fidelistas" were perceived as holding positions fairly close to Fidel Castro on most issues. The two exceptions to this tendency occurred on the questions relating to the US and the USSR. Unlike any other actor, the "fidelista" grouping strongly opposed closer ties with either superpower (Figure 4). This indicates that the panel members viewed this group as being highly nationalistic. Their view of the US has been heavily influenced by Washington's support for the Batista regime during the guerrilla struggle, by US involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion, and by subsequent US efforts to bring down the revolutionary government. Apparently, their nationalistic outlook also affects their view of the USSR. They are perceived as preferring at least a slight reduction in Moscow's heavy influence on Cuban policymaking.

Fourth, Raul Castro is viewed by the panel members as an aggressive hardliner on virtually all issues. The younger

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Castro differs from Fidel on most issues such as the desirability of an expanded military role in Africa (Figure 1 and Figure 3), the degree of cooperation with the USSR and the wisdom of better relations with the US (Figure 4), and the need for continued consumer austerity (Figure 5). On every issue, the views of the "new military" were closer to Raul Castro than to any other actor.

Finally, Fidel Castro is located in a relatively centrist position on every issue dimension except the Soviet category. The other six actors never coalesce as a single group against him and only on the Soviet dimension do more than three actors merge into a relatively close grouping in a position significantly distant from his. Consequently, unified opposition to Fidel does not exist and seems highly improbable in the future. In fact, Castro's position probably serves as a unifying force upon an otherwise divided leadership. Figures 1 - 5 strongly underline a thesis advanced by most Cuban scholars: Fidel Castro is the glue that holds a highly diverse leadership group together. Given Raul Castro's extreme position on virtually every issue, he would be unable to perform the same role should his older brother suddenly pass from the scene. Such an event could produce a bitter dichotomy in the Cuban leadership.

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Comparison of Panel Judgments


The simulated polling technique also provided an opportunity to examine the similarities and dissimilarities among the analysts who completed the questionnaire. Figure 6 shows the judgments made by each panel member concerning the relative positions of each actor on all 24 issues. In other words, each of the points that represent Fidel Castro reflects a different analyst's evaluation about the policy position held by the Cuban leader.

As is illustrated by Figure 6, the six analysts agree on the general location of the Cuban leaders, but in some cases there is a significant difference of opinion. The extent of the difference is represented by the distance between the various positions occupied by a given actor. We believe that these differences result from at least two factors:

- 1) Actual substantive differences in the analyst's views of the policy positions held by the Cuban leadership.

Comparison of Panel Members' Evaluation

Figure 6



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- 2) Technical differences resulting from variations in the analysts' experience and familiarity with survey questionnaires.

Figure 6 shows fairly close agreement among the analysts concerning the "technocrats" and the "old communists" on the left side of the configuration and Raul Castro and the "new military" at the opposite side. The horizontal dimension seems to be identical to the "cautious-aggressive" continuum that characterized Figures 1 and 2. The analysts as a group, however, show much less agreement concerning Fidel Castro and the "fidelistas" who are located in the center portion of the configuration. Given the Cuban leader's pattern of sudden policy reversals and his propensity for bold and unexpected actions, the lack of a close consensus on his position is not a surprising result. The variation in the location of the "fidelistas" apparently is directly related to the position of Fidel Castro rather than any uncertainty about their attitudes. Most of the experts, regardless of how they viewed Fidel Castro, placed the "fidelistas" in a position very close to the Cuban leader. This tendency was even stronger in the case of Raul Castro and the "new military."

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The vertical axis in Figure 6 can be interpreted as representing scoring tendencies of the panel of experts rather than some aspect of the policy positions of the Cuban leadership. Most of the panel members have positioned the seven actors in the same order along the horizontal dimension, but show considerable differences in their locations on the vertical dimension. For example, all but one of the points representing Analyst E are located in the bottom portion of the Figure. An examination of the scoring responses of this analyst revealed that this participant scored his answers the highest. His overall average score was 3.16. Analysts with lower average scores are located at the top of the vertical dimension. Analyst D had an overall average of 2.41.

Utilizing the multidimensional scaling technique to produce graphic comparisons of the panel members is proving to be the most beneficial result of the experiment. We have found that the configurations serve as an efficient tool for guiding substantive discussions by the panel members concerning their views of the Cuban leadership. Major differences between analysts can be quickly perceived in the visual models. These differences might not become apparent in a purely verbal discussion.

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

The standard procedure for measuring political attitudes is the opinion poll. But when the objective is to measure the political attitudes of foreign leaders rather than of the general population there is a problem of access. Most leaders have neither the time nor the inclination to complete questionnaires.

Simulated opinion polling is one way of getting around this problem. Instead of giving the questionnaire to foreign leaders, we give it to a number of people specializing in that country, and ask them to respond to the questions as they think the foreign leaders would respond. This combines two techniques: opinion polling and role playing. It provides a large body of data that can be analyzed to identify potential cleavages and coalitions on diverse issues within a foreign leadership group. It can also serve to identify differing assumptions and judgments among a group of analysts on a given country or subject.

Our first experiment with this technique is being conducted by the Cuba Analytic Center and the Analytic Methods staff of

the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. The seven key individual leaders or leadership groups in the Cuban government were identified.


We then formulated 24 statements concerning Cuban foreign and domestic policy and asked six Cuban experts to indicate the extent to which they felt the seven leaders or leadership groups agreed or disagreed with these statements. Figure 7 illustrates the format of the questionnaire.

The six analysts, each judging the position of seven leaders or leadership groups on 24 issues provided over a thousand judgments about the Cuban leadership views. We then summarized this data to present it in such a manner that the significant conclusions--differences among the Cuban leaders as well as the differences among our experts in assessing the Cuban leadership--would be graphically apparent. For the bulk of this work, we selected a statistical program called multi dimensional scaling.

Multidimensional scaling requires some measurement of the similarity between every pair of objects (in this case, key actors in the Cuban hierarchy) being analyzed. The measurements utilized in this study are euclidian distance matrices. Figure 8 is an example of such a matrix. It shows that the computed euclidian distances between each

Figure 7

Cuban combat forces should cross the border of Somalia along with Ethiopian troops to administer a complete defeat to the Somali army. (Make your assessment as of February - March 1978 rather than the present time.)



pair of actors on the questions relating to Africa. The distances in the matrix represent degrees of similarity between each pair of actors.

Figure 8

Euclidian Distances on African Issues

	Fidel Castro	Fidel- istas	Raul Castro	New Mil.	C.R. Rod.	Old Com.	Tech
Fidel Castro	0.0						
Fidelistas	0.131	0.0					
Raul Castro	0.558	0.444	0.0				
New Military	0.6111	0.500	0.080	0.0			
C.R. Rodriguez	0.303	0.421	0.827	0.868	0.0		
Old Communists	0.181	0.295	0.705	0.749	0.138	0.0	
Technocrats	0.470	0.581	0.964	1.000	0.191	0.298	0.0

The smaller the distance value, the greater the similarity between the two actors on the policy issues in question. Thus, Raul Castro and the "new military" show the greatest similarity (0.080) on the African questions. Conversely, the "technocrats" and the "new military" show the least similarity (1.000). The multidimensional scaling program takes this information and depicts it graphically in terms of distances between the objects. Thus, the data shown in Figure 8 is depicted visually in Figure 1. As in the euclidian distance matrix,

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the "new military" group is closest to Raul Castro and the "technocrats" are the most distant from him.

The program produces the graphs by first placing the objects in a space of N dimensions and attempting to replicate the distances between each pair of objects as shown in the euclidian distance matrix. It finds the most satisfactory configuration by starting with a random configuration and moving all the points a bit to decrease the "stress," a measure of the "goodness" of the solution. This stress value is at a minimum for the best solution and increases sharply when too few dimensions are utilized. This procedure is repeated over and over again until some stopping criterion is reached. According to Joseph B. Kruskal, "technically speaking, KYST (the multidimensional scaling program used in this study) uses the iterative numerical method of gradients with a stepwise procedure based primarily on the angles between successive gradients."<sup>16</sup>

The chief output from the technique is a spatial arrangement of points. Each point on the paper represents one of the objects in the distance matrix. The best and certainly easiest method for interpreting the output is simply to look at the configuration and see which points are close together and which are far apart. The question of dimensionality

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requires that the analyst suggest substantive interpretation to the meaning of the relative distances between the items. In this study, this was accomplished by a careful examination of the responses given by the panel of experts on each question.

<sup>1</sup>Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1978, p. 83.

<sup>2</sup>For more detailed examinations of the Cuba-US relationship, see Roger W. Fontaine, On Negotiating with Cuba, (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: 1975); Lynn D. Bender, The Politics of Hostility: Castro's Revolution and United States Policy, (Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, Inter American University Press; 1975); Cole Blasier, "The Elimination of United States Influence," in Revolutionary Change in Cuba, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973).

<sup>3</sup>Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence: The CIA Experience (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press: 1978), pp. 1-10.

<sup>4</sup>The technique utilized here is adapted from the approach developed by Edward Gonzalez, Luigi Einaudi, Nathan Leites, Richard Maullin, and David Ronfeldt, "Divisions within the Cuban Leadership: Their Implications for Cuba and the United States" (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica: 1971).

<sup>5</sup>The six analysts have followed Cuba for periods ranging from 2-20 years. They include four political analysts, a biographic analyst, and an economist.

<sup>6</sup>The general term, multidimensional scaling, embraces a wide range of data analysis techniques. It refers here, however, to the set of techniques developed by Roger N. Shepard and J.B. Kruskal at Bell Laboratories. See Roger N. Shepard, A Kimball Romney, and Sara Beth Nerlove, eds. Multidimensional Scaling, 2 vols. (New York, Seminar Press: 1972).

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass, The Belknap Press: 1978); Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company: 1974); Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge, Mass. The M.I.T. Press: 1967); and William M. LeoGrande "Continuity and Change in the Cuban Political Elite" Cuban Studies (July 1978) pp. 1-31.

<sup>8</sup>For a detailed description of the revolutionary origins of the current Cuban leadership see Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959 (New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books: 1974).



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17. Cuba should attempt to give new momentum to the process of normalization by releasing one or two US political prisoners. (December 1978)
18. Cuba should continue the process of normalization with the US. New momentum should be instilled in the process by reducing the level of Cuban rhetoric and diplomatic activity aimed at achieving Puerto Rican independence. (December 1978)
19. Cuba should react strongly to the resumption of the SR-71 overflights by publicly denouncing the action, and by asserting Cuba's right to obtain the weapons necessary to defend itself. Cuba should also imply that future transgressions of its airspace could provoke a military incident. (November 1978)
20. Cuba should shift some of its construction resources from investment to consumption, including housing. (December 1978)
21. Cuban peasants should be allowed to market their products in the city in order to raise productivity and reduce shortages. (December 1978)
22. The concept of "cottage industries" (small family businesses) should be liberalized to permit limited sales of their products on an open market. (December 1978)
23. The government should expand the selection and quantity of goods available on the so-called "parallel market" (special government outlets where items are sold outside the rationing system for much higher prices.) (December 1978)
24. The government should begin an energetic campaign to force small farmers (who currently own their land) to join cooperative farms in order to increase agricultural efficiency. (December 1978)

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APPENDIX B

Policy Issues

1. Cuban combat forces should cross the border of Somalia along with Ethiopian troops to administer a complete defeat to the Somali army. (Make your assessment as of February-March 1978 rather than the present time.)
2. Cuban combat forces should give complete and full support to the Ethiopian military campaign against the Eritrean separatists. This would include the utilization of mechanized infantry, artillery, and armored units in combat against the Eritreans. (April 1978)
3. Cuban military personnel should provide heavy advisory and logistical support for the Ethiopian campaign against the Eritreans. Cuba should also perform various combat support missions such as MIG pilots, helicopter pilots, and artillery support. (April 1978)
4. Cuban military personnel should provide only limited advisory and logistical support to the Ethiopian campaign against the Eritreans. This would exclude even indirect combat support such as artillery fire and pilots. (April 1978)
5. Cuba should begin a gradual withdrawal of its combat forces from Ethiopia in order to undercut criticism from moderates in the nonaligned movement and to remove bilateral tensions with the radical Arab nations sympathetic to the Eritreans. (December 1978)
6. Cuba should significantly expand its combat role in Angola to suppress, once and for all, the UNITA guerrillas. This would involve increasing the number of Cuban combat troops by another 10,000 men if necessary. (December 1978)
7. Cuba should make partial troop reductions in Angola and Ethiopia to free some of its troops for use in the struggle to achieve a black nationalist government in Rhodesia. (December 1978)
8. Cuba should provide political support (propaganda) to the FSLN, provide safe haven for FSLN guerrillas in Cuba, and train FSLN guerrillas in Cuba. No other support should be provided in order to avoid provoking a US intervention. (August 1978)

9. Cuba should, in addition to providing the above support, provide limited covert assistance to the FSLN (through third parties) including funds and weapons. (August 1978)
10. Cuba should, in addition to providing the support described in the above two questions, also send a small number of advisers (5 - 10) to provide tactical guidance to the FSLN in Nicaragua. (August 1978)
11. Cuba should intervene militarily (combat troops) in Nicaragua if the following scenario occurs: The FSLN is able to seize and occupy a significant portion of territory, including some cities, declare itself the legitimate government of Nicaragua, obtain recognition from one or two Latin American nations, and requests the assistance of Cuban troops. (August 1978)
12. Cuba should attempt to demonstrate greater independence of the USSR on certain foreign policy issues. This should be accomplished by voicing mild criticism of the Soviet positions on LOS matters. For example, the Soviet positions are in conflict with the needs of underdeveloped nations. (December 1978)
13. Cuba should attempt to demonstrate greater independence of the USSR on certain foreign policy matters. In addition to criticizing the Soviet positions on LOS as described above, Cuba should also criticize Moscow's position in the UN opposing military budget reductions. (The Soviet position is essentially the same as the US. Criticism by Cuba could be accomplished without naming Moscow directly, but merely castigating the selfish attitude of the big powers.) (December 1978)
14. Cuba should attempt to demonstrate greater independence from the USSR by making some symbolic purchases of a small number of non-Soviet weapons, such as armored personnel carriers, anti-tank weapons, etc. (December 1978)
15. Cuba should attempt to gain a greater measure of independence from the USSR. This should be accomplished by seeking alternative sources of petroleum from the radical Arab nations and reducing the percentage of trade between Cuba and the USSR/ East Europe. (December 1978)
16. Cuba should temporarily abandon its efforts to improve relations with the US by announcing that no further gestures will be made until the US agrees to lift the economic embargo. (December 1978)

<sup>9</sup>See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, Revised Edition (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press: 1978) pp. 6-8.

<sup>10</sup>According to Gonzalez, Einaudi, Leites, Maullin, and Ronfeldt op. cit., Almeida, Valdes, Hart, del Valle, and Garcia are members of the "fidelista" group (pp. 18-19). Andres Suarez, op. cit., notes that Pedro Miret was associated with Fidel Castro when they were both students at the University of Havana (p. 193).

<sup>11</sup>The measure developed to describe the "goodness" of the plot--the "stress" value serves as the basic criterion for determining whether a multidimensional configuration is satisfactory. In the case of Figure 1, the stress value was 0.008, indicating an "excellent" solution. The guideline adopted by Kruskal for interpreting stress is as follows:

Excellent	0.000-0.100
Good	0.101-0.200
Fair	0.201-0.400
Poor	0.401-1.000

<sup>12</sup>The stress value for Figure 2 was 0.004, indicating an "excellent" solution.

<sup>13</sup>The stress value for Figure 3 was 0.000, indicating an "excellent" solution.

<sup>14</sup>The stress value for Figure 4 was 0.004, indicating an "excellent" solution.

<sup>15</sup>The stress value for Figure 5 was 0.008, indicating an "excellent" solution.

<sup>16</sup>Joseph B. Kruskal, How to Use KYST-2, A Very Flexible Program to Do Multidimensional Scaling and Unfolding, C. Murray Hill, Bell Laboratories: 1978) pp. 7-10

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